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The Eurasian region continues to disintegrate, and neither Russia nor the West has been
able to arrest the destabilizing dynamics. Evidence of rising instability throughout the
region include the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, terrorist attacks in the Northern
Caucasus, the persistent failure of Western forces to stabilize Afghanistan, the inability of
Central Asian rulers to reign in local clans and drug lords, and the paralysis of legitimately
elected bodies of power in Ukraine and Moldova. The West’s attempts to secure and
stabilize Eurasia after the end of the Cold War have not led to success. Russia too has
greatly contributed to the Eurasian meltdown. The Soviet collapse and the subsequent
retreat of Russia from the region have greatly destabilized the area. The relative recovery of
the Russian economy during the post-Yeltsin decade began to revive Russia’s standing in
Eurasia, yet Moscow could ill afford serious efforts to stabilize and pacify the region.
Russia’s resurgence is a response to its lacking recognition as a vital power and partner of
the West. If Russia chooses to dedicate itself to obstructing Western policies in Eurasia, we
will see more of the collapsing dynamics in the region. Preventing this requires recog-
nizing Russia’s role in stabilizing the region and working with Russia in developing a joint
assessment of threat and establishing a collective security arrangement in Eurasia.
Copyright  2011, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Produced and
distributed by Elsevier Limited. All rights reserved.“Russia’s external geopolitical interests are to the 1. Introduction
maximum degree tied, to the Great Limitrof [a buffer
zone separating Russia from Europe and, Asia - AT],
whereas problems of other civilizational entities are to
us of, the global, rather than the geopolitical,
importance.”




-PaciﬁcResearchCenter,HanyIn themid-1990s – in response to rising instability in the
former Soviet region and the decision by NATO to expand
eastward – Russian analysts begun to seriously reﬂect
about a security vacuum and disintegration trends in Eur-
asia. While some of them insisted that Russia remained the
only stabilizing force, others understood that the formerly
central power was in no position to play its traditional role
and must be prepared – for a long time – to decrease its
international responsibilities in the region. Those in the
latter group argued that stabilization by taking on a new
burden of empire was out of the question.2 Among them,
Vladimir Tsymburski proposed that Russia concentrate on
internal development and restrict its external tasks to2 This debate has been well documented in a number of publications.
See, for example, Aron (1998) and Tsygankov (2003).
angUniversity.ProducedanddistributedbyElsevierLimited.All rights reserved.
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argued that, while the danger of the region’s destabilization
was serious and could translate into a great war, Russia was
sufﬁciently secure if it managed to guarantee a minimal
peace within a buffer zone separating it from Europe and
Asia by engaging in defensive balancing politics. Indeed,
Tsymburski maintained that, while transitioning from the
imperial status to that of the geopolitical “island”, Russia
remained an indispensable power.3
As a modest tribute to Tsymburski’s contribution to
Russia’s geopolitical thinking, this paper sontinues with
the theme of Eurasia’s instability. I argue that since the
mid-1990s, the region has not became more stable.4
Evidence of rising instability throughout the region
include the August 2008 Russia-Georgia war, terrorist
attacks in the Northern Caucasus, the persistent failure of
Western forces to stabilize Afghanistan, the inability of
Central Asian rulers to reign in local clans and drug lords,
and the paralysis of legitimately elected bodies of power in
Ukraine and Moldova. Neither Russia nor other great
powers have been able to arrest the destabilizing dynamics
in the region after the end of the Cold War. Russia has
greatly contributed to the Eurasian meltdown by loosing
its internal strength and focus on what Tsymburski called
the Great Limitrof or an a buffer zone separating Russia
from European and Asian civilizations. The interests of
China and the Muslim world have been too peripheral to
successfully ﬁll the emerged security vacuum and
compensate for the weakness of Russia in Eurasia. As to the
West, its attempts to become the sole referee and security
provider in the region have been ill-conceived encouraging
Russia’s anti-Western thinking and the zero-sum compe-
tition for spheres of inﬂuence. Engaging Russia as an equal
and, indeed, indispensable participant in a larger collective
security-based arrangement in the region remains a better
strategy than attempts to conﬁne Russia’s activities within
its national boundaries.
The paper’s organization is as follows. It ﬁrst discusses
the historic and contemporary context of Eurasia’s
stability and meltdown. It then reviews contributions to
the region’s continuious disintegration made by Russia,
the neighboring non-Western powers (China and the
Muslim world), and the West. The next section explains
why Russia, despite its weakness, remains irreplacable for
delivering and consolidating security gains in Eurasia. In
the concluding part, I discuss speciﬁc policies that must
be advanced to prevent further violence and breakdown
in the region.5 Arnold Toynbee’s notion of “external proletariat” captures the violent2. Eurasia in world history
As a landmass, the Eurasian region has traditionally
prevented the Western world from a direct confrontation
with non-Western civilizations. Occupying the vast space
between central and northern Europe, the Middle East3 For more on his views, see his Tsymburski (2007). Many of his articles
are assembled by the site Russki Arkhipelag at http://www.archipelag.ru.
4 For the reversed argument that expectations of conﬂict within the
former Soviet Union have been wrong, see, for example, Robinson (2010).and eastern Asia, Eurasia connects and helps to stabilize
some most volatile territories – the Balkans, the Caucasus,
Central Asia and Afghanistan – from which instability
tends to spread outward. Historically, each of these
territories has been located between major cultural enti-
ties while not developing a sufﬁciently strong identiﬁca-
tion with any of them in particular, producing instead
a dense mixture of ethnic, religious, and linguistic afﬁli-
ations. Under conditions of external tensions these terri-
tories tend to be destabilized, leading the way to violence
of a much greater scope.5 Under more stable international
conditions, they serve as cultural, political and trans-
portation bridges connecting large cultures and conti-
nents across the world.
As a uniﬁed region, Eurasia has been held together by
political, economic and cultural layers. Politically, the
region has consisted of principalities or empires but rarely
with recognized ﬁxed territorial boundaries, remaining
relatively open to inside and outside inﬂuences. Since the
18th century, Eurasia has established itself as a Russia-
centered empire that ultimately has stretched from the
Baltics to Afghanistan. In 1943, the British geographer
Halford Mackinder famously referred to Russia as the
“Heartland” of Eurasia and “the greatest natural fortress
on earth.”6 Economically, the region has been a wealth of
resources which it extracted and transported from one
continent to another, mostly from East to West. The Baltic
Sea and the Black Sea have been especially important for
economic connections across continents. In addition,
Eurasia has brought together diverse ethnicities and
religions, teaching them how to communicate and
preserve a measure of cultural openness. Politically,
economically and culturally, the region has functioned as
a unity in diversity, serving as a hub of various inﬂuences
and providing stability for European nations to the north
and for the nations of Asia and the Middle East to the
south.
Perhaps most signiﬁcantly, Eurasia has historically
solidiﬁed the great cultural peace between the Christian
West and the Islamic world. After the decline of the
Mongols, Europe emerged as the most powerful civiliza-
tion. Still fearful of Muslims, it relied mainly on military
and economic expansion to secure its position in the
world. It was ultimately left to the Russians to learn how
to absorb inﬂuences from both East and West, thereby
preserving the fragile cross-cultural equilibrium. While
identifying with Eastern Christianity, the Russian empire
developed tolerance toward other cultures. Tensions
between the Russians and other nationalities were a part
of the empire’s existence, yet these tensions were not as
pronounced as in overseas empires, partly because of the
absence of an ofﬁcial distinction made between the
between the metropolitan center and the colonialpotential of these borderland territories. In Russian geopolitics, Tsym-
burski theorized the areas as located in between “civilizations” intro-
ducing in their description the notion of Limitrof (See his “Narody
mezhdu tsivilizatsiyami,” and “Geopolitika dlya ‘yevraziyskoi Atlantidy’”
in Tsymburski, Ostrov Rossiya).
6 Mackinder (1943, p. 601).
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ries became full components of the empire as soon as
practicable.”7 Since Catherine the Great, the Russian
empire developed special ties with Islam by supporting
those Muslim authorities who were willing to submit to
the empire’s general directions and even by serving as
arbitrator in disputes between Muslims from the Volga
River to Central Asia.8 Russian intellectuals, both West-
ernizers and Slavophiles, had difﬁculties with accepting
Islam but were ultimately challenged in their Eurocentric
assumptions.9
More than anything else, this cultural experience made
Russia the heartland of Eurasia.10 With its access to vast
resources, its large landmass and highly centralized state,
the culturally open empire was able to provide the region
with economic, political and cultural cohesion. Although
the system underwent a major mutation under Soviet rule,
it preserved some important ties across the region. In line
with the old Russia, the Soviet Union did not become an
empire in the traditional sense of the word. Rather, it
became what one historian called an “afﬁrmative-action
empire,”11 in which all decision-making power was
concentrated at the center, but nationalities were granted
multiple privileges, including the territorial status of
republics and various afﬁrmative-action programs to
reserve local cultures and languages. In addition, no matter
the absolutist and centralist nature of the Soviet state,
citizens were provided with important social and economic
rights.12 An emergency system, rather than a natural state
of the Russian historic statehood,13 the Soviet Union has
played its role in unifying Eurasia and preserving the global
peace.3. Contemporary Eurasia: conﬂict and meltdown
That contemporary Eurasia is in a state of decline is
evident from the disintegrating structure of its economic,
political and cultural strata. Economically, it is no longer
a uniﬁed region, given the emergent rivalry among major
powers over energy routes and the competing foreign
policy orientations among smaller states. Politically, the
formerly afﬁrmative-action empire has been transformed
into a collection of nationalist entities led by predatory and
opportunistic elites. Culturally, the region that once prided7 Hosking (1997, p. 40).
8 Crews (2006). The Ottoman empire developed similar relations with
its Jewish and Christian minorities. See Lieven (2000, p. 149).
9 For some overviews of the debate between the so-called Eurasianists
and those favoring Russia’s European development, see Neumann (1996),
Laruelle (2008), Tsygankov (2008).
10 For a sample of studies of Russia in Eurasia, both critical and
supportive of the heartland thesis, see Trenin (2001), Tsygankov (2003),
Bassin and Aksenov (2006), Wohlforth (2006), Morozova (2009),
Ismailov and Papava (2010).
11 Martin (2001).
12 The initial argument about continuity between the old and new
Russia was formulated by Nicholai Berdyayev, Istoki i smysl russkogo
kommunizma (Paris: IMCA Press, 1937).
13 McDaniel (1996).itself in cross-ethnic diversity is turning into one with
growing cross-ethnic violence.
Evidence of rising instability are everywhere
throughout the region. They are in the August 2008 war
in the Caucasus and in the tense atmosphere in the region
following the war. The war has revealed the failure of
European security system to maintain peace and stability
prompting Russia to call for the system’s reform.
Although Russia prevailed in the crisis, it has little to be
triumphant about and President Dmitri Medvedev was
correct to emphasize the collective nature of the problem
and to propose a collective solution involving European
peacekeepers.14 No viable international institutions exist
in the Caucasus, and the international law is silent in the
Caucasus as it was silent when Yugoslavia and Iraq were
attacked by the Western powers without the United
Nations’ approval.
Evidence of instability are also in renewed terrorist
attacks in the the Northern Caucasus. Terrorism is con-
tained in Chechnya but continues to spread throughout
other parts of the region – Dagestan, Ingushetia,
Kabardino-Balkaria, and North Ossetia. Even Moscow has
been under attack. In October 2002 Chechen Jihadists
seized a Moscow movie theater, threatening to blow up
themselves and 700 hostages. Since then Jihadists were
trying to stage violent actions in the Russia’s capital. They
succeeded on March 29, 2010 when two female suicide
bombers trained by the Caucasus-centered Doku Umarov
detonated their explosives inside a Metro train killing 40
people and injuring many more. Just two days later, two
explosions killed 12 people in Kizlyar, Dagestan. The
Kremlin responded by outlining a new anti-terrorism
strategy for the region,15 but the violence is far from
curtailed. For example, on September 9, 2010, a car bomb
near the entrance of a market in North Ossetia’s Vladi-
kavkaz killed 15 people and injured 96.16 Another major
attack took place in January 2011 at the Domodedovo
Airport leaving 37 people dead and more than 100
injured.
The region’s instability also reveals itself in the persis-
tent failure of Western forces to stabilize Afghanistan and
the inability of Central Asian rulers to reign in local clans
and drug lords. In Afghanistan, the Western coalition is not
successful in securing control over areas around Kabul. Not
having won support from local groups in the country, the
United States looks for ways to negotiate with the Taliban
and withdraw from the region – possibly before Afghan
army and security forces are properly trained. In Central
Asia, a hidden inta-elite struggle for power is waiting to
erupt into a large-scale confrontation, as the sides employ
resources such as mob violence and recruitment of Jihadist
ﬁghters. In June 2010, Kyrgystan went through ethnic riots
and violent transfer of power, and the Kyrgyz-Uzbek
border was destabilized. In the fall of the same year,14 “European Security Treaty,” November 29, 2009 <www.kremlin.ru>.
15 “Medvedev outlines anti-terrorism strategy for North Caucasus,” RIA
Novosti, April 1, 2010.
16 Anastasia Ustinova, “Putin Calls on Muslims to Battle Terror After
Blast Kills 15,” Bloomberg, September 9, 2010.
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members of the old political elite that participated in
1992–1997 civil war and the terrorist group Islamic
Movement of Uzbekistan.17 Should the neighboring
Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Iran be destabilized further,
the vacuum of instability may be quickly ﬁlled by Sunni or
Shi’ite radicals. Then what has been prevented in Tajikistan
in the 1990s, may still come to pass in the larger Central
Asia.
The disturbing developments in Ukraine and Moldova
include the paralysis of legitimately elected bodies of
power. Deep cultural dvisions and rivalry between Russia
and the Western powers for inﬂuence over the Ukraine
and Moldova’s leaderships have made it impossible for
them to choose and implement a policy program. In
Ukraine, business elites have pulled the country in
different directions blocking state ability to form
a coherent course. On surface, after transfer of power in
2009, the political system is changing toward its greater
centralization, as Constitutional Court revived presidential
control over key powers, lost to parliament in 2004. In
reality, however, neither foreign powers nor internal oli-
garchs found an agreement regarding the country’s
future. In Moldova, the government went through several
crises trying to secure popular support. The Communist
Party, which ruled during 2001–2009, worked to main-
tain good relations with both Russia and the European
Union. By declaring its lack of interest in joining NATO,
Kishinev then also encouraged Russia to mediate between
Moldova and its breakaway region, Transdniestria, to help
bridge the gap between the two sides. By contrast, the
new leadership severed ties with Russia and does not
have the required support for ruling. The liberal Alliance’s
attempt to switch to direct presidential elections by
organizing a referendum in Moldova failed.18 Molovan
leadership, however, is determined to strengthen its ties
with the European Union and the United States at the
expense of those with Russia.19
State weakness notwithstanding, even the smallest and
poorest countries in the region, such as Kyrgyzstan, Taji-
kistan, Moldova, and Georgia, seek to to establish their own
identity at the expense of Russia, the former metropole,
and are willing to play it against other great powers.20 Such
policies have been marked by similar disregard for their
societies’ domestic and international conditions, among
which are ethnic heterogeneity, weak national identity,
lack of internationally tradable resources and volatile
geopolitical environment.21 The nationalist thinking invites
violence that is gradually spreading throughout Eurasia,
waiting for an opportunity to erupt into a large-scale
conﬂict.17 Lola Olimova and Nargis Hamrabaeva, “Tajikistan struggles to quell
militants,” Asia Times, October 7, 2010.
18 Richard Balmforth, “Moldova poll fails, ruling Alliance on back foot,”
Reuters, September 6, 2010.
19 Svetlana Gamova, “Kishinev budet zhit’ ne po Moskve, a po
Vashingtonu,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, March 11, 2011.
20 Suny (2010).
21 Tsygankov (2007).4. Russia’s weakness
Russia has been a major contributing force to the
Eurasian meltdown. The Soviet collapse and the subse-
quent senseless retreat of Russia from the region were not
inevitable and have greatly destabilized the area by playing
a role of what Vladimir Putin deﬁned as the “greatest
geopolitical catastrophe of the century.”22
Trying to revolutionize foreign policy simultaneously
with fundamental reforms in the economy, political
system, and the area of center–periphery relations has
been an admirable, but ultimately impossible task. By not
dealing with the nationalities crisis in a timely manner,
Gorbachev worsened his domestic standing, and the public
had difﬁculties with trusting his course. Symptomatically,
during 1988–1989 the percentage of those viewing
nationalities’ relations as worsening increased from 38 to
72%, and in 1989 30% of the respondents thought that
a future civil war was likely.23 To his credit, the father of
New Thinking acknowledged the defeat and resigned as
president of a country that was no more. The record of
Gorbachev’s successors is even worse. Unlike Gorbachev,
who had at least offered his country an opportunity to
reformulate its sense of national pride, the new Russia’s
leaders were astonishingly unimaginative in their vision of
national identity and entrusted the West with deﬁning the
priorities of their country and the larger Eurasian region. At
the time when the region was desperately searching for
self-deﬁnition after the end of the Soviet system, the
radically pro-Western leaders denied the very legitimacy of
such a search by offering it the “solution” of becoming
a part of theWest. By the mid-1990s, Eurasia still existed in
people’s minds,24 and Russia’s new foreign minister, Yev-
geni Primakov, attempted to re-integrate the region.
However, the efforts to re-integrate the former Soviet states
around Russia by generously using the tool of ﬁnancial
subsidies could no longer work – the Kremlin was nearly
bankrupt, barely making its own ends meet.
By the time Putin had assumed power, Moscow’s
severely undermined position in the region was obvious to
everyone, especially after new terrorist attacks had taken
place in Chechnya and other parts of Russia. The relative
recovery of the economy during the post-Yelstin decade
began to revive Russia’s popularity in Eurasia,25 yet the
nation could ill afford efforts to single-handedly stabilize
and pacify the region. At best, the Kremlin could defend its
core interests in regional and global settings and begin to
escape the alternative of an unstable society, dwindling22 Putin (2008, p. 272).
23 Levada (2008, p. 280, 288).
24 During the referendum on 17 March 1991, which has taken place in
the context of Gorbachev’s struggle for a renewed Union and was con-
ducted in all of the Soviet republics except the three Baltics, Armenia,
Georgia, and Moldavia, 147 million people voted and 76.4 percent
approved the preservation of the union. The wording of the question was
as follows, “Do you support the preservation of the union as a renewed
federation of sovereign republics in which the rights of a person of any
nationality are fully guaranteed?” The Yeltsin-led Democratic Russia has
actively campaigned against the referendum (Kotz & Weir 1997, p. 147).
25 Hill (2006), Tsygankov (2006).
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high oil prices, it could also advocate multilateral
arrangements in the region and strengthen its presence in
neighboring economies and energy companies worldwide.
Finally, it demonstrated its ability to overwhelmingly
defeat the army of Georgia using several armored battal-
ions, air power and marines.
None of this meant that Russia has gained enough
power to become the engine of Eurasia it once was. The
global economic crisis has further revealed the tenuous
nature of Russia’s recovery and the remaining weaknesses
of its power base. During the recent crisis, Russia, which is
heavily dependent on energy, including exports, was hit
particularly hard and its GDP fell by around 8 percent in
2009, while China and India continued to grow, albeit at
a slower pace. Russia has also had to spend a considerable
portion of its reserves to bail out domestic enterprises,
including non-competitive ones, and to scale down its
activist foreign policy in Central Asia and the Caucasus.26
Although the nation has become stronger and more
conﬁdent since 2000, it is not a rising power given the
growing international competition and domestic
constraints on its development. It is catching up with some
European economies, but is unable to narrow a widening
gap with China and India. Although largely successful
relative to the ﬁfteen years of decline, Russia is only
modestly successful relative to the rising challenges ahead.
This pattern is noticeable in multiple areas of its develop-
ment. Russia can report successes in economic and military
development, demographics,27 strengthening ties with
neighbors, and ﬁghting crime and corruption, but none of
these successes warrants calling Russia a rising great
power. In addition, the legacy of an “incomplete” power
continues to complicate Russia’s development. The country
has progressed in some areas, but continues to stagnate
and fall behind in others. Russia has met some of its
economic and security challenges, but it has also perpetu-
ated an insufﬁciently diversiﬁed economic structure and
has failed to address some serious gaps in its social
infrastructure.285. China and the Muslim world
China and the Muslimworld are also not in a position to
fully address the growing instability in Eurasia. They have
limited tools for inﬂuencing the region and their visions
and policies serve to satisfy their narrowly-deﬁned
interests.
To China, Eurasia is of importance as an area free of
Western military presence and an additional source of
resources, especially natural gas. China seeks to inﬂuence
the region via the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
(SCO) established in July 2001 with Russia and four Central
Asian states to address threats from terrorism and the26 Mankoff (2010).
27 For example, in 2008, Russia’s population decline slowed down by
50%, relative to 2007 (“Russia’s population shrinks by 113,300 in 10
mths,” Interfax, December 19, 2008).
28 For development of this argument, see Tsygankov (2010).security vacuum in the area. China is also increasingly
successful in gaining access to Central Asian energy
reserves and winning new contracts with the wealthiest
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. As a result of
Beijing’s commercial expansion to the region, China’s trade
with Central Asia rose twenty ﬁve times – from $1 billion in
2000 to $25 billion in 2008 – matching Russia’s trade with
the region.29 The global ﬁnancial crisis made China’s
economic inﬂuence on the region even more pronounced.
As Russia’s economy contracted by 8% in 2009, China’s
economy kept growing by 8–9%. Since December 2009,
Turkmenistan has opened a major gas pipeline with China
through Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. China National
Petroleum Corporation now ownes 50% stake in Kazakh-
stan’s largest oil company, outbidding Russia’s Gazprom,
and China invested $4 billion in Turkmenistan’s largest gas
producer, assisting the Central Asian state during its gas
dispute with Moscow.30
Still, China’s Eurasia reach is limited given Beijing’s
relatively peripheral geographic location as well as lacking
energy reserves and cultural capital. China has emerged as
a center of the world’s gravity in the Asia-Paciﬁc region, but
Beijing continues to be passive and disengaged from
making explicit choices in Eurasia. Not being geographi-
cally central to the region, China continues to delegate
solution of critical security issues in Eurasia to other
powers. Its lack of initiative in stabilizing the neighboring
Afghanistan or Kyrgyzstan is noteworthy. In addition, China
is aware of resentment its expansion continues to generate
in Russia and Central Asia. Although Central Asian elites are
not happy with Moscow’s lack of sensitivity toward their
interests, they remain attracted to Russia – by virtue of
memory of the Soviet past, multiple lingustic and cultural
ties. In addition, Central Asian states continue to be suspi-
cious regarding China’s culture and political intentions in
the region.31
Even more peripheral is the inﬂuence on Eurasia by the
Muslimworld. The two core Muslim states with interests in
Eurasia – Iran and Turkey – are able to inﬂuence the areas
around the Caspean Sea and the Black Sea, respectively.
However, their ambitions in Eurasia are limited by
competition for inﬂuence in the larger Middle Eastern
region. After the United States’ invasion of Iraq, the two
have emerged as leading powers that seek to intensify their
diplomatic activities, military buildup, and establishment
of energy ties. Iran has sought to expand its presence in
Eurasia via joining the SCO, but – due to China’s veto – Iran
was only able to gain an associate membership in the
organization. Its inﬂuence on Turkmenistan and the largely
Shia Azerbaijan is notable, yet it is limited as far as other
states in the region are concerned. Turkey has some
important interests in the the Central Asia, the Caucasus
and Crimea, and Istambul has cooperated with Moscow in
improving security in the Black Sea area. However, Turkey’s
main objective is to position itself as the post-Attaturk state29 Laruelle and Peyrus (2010).
30 Jeffrey Mankoff and Leland R. Miller, “China-Russia Competition
Opens a Door for America,” Forbes, April 22, 2010.
31 Laruelle (2009), Laruelle and Peyrus (2010).
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a hub for energy pipelines connecting Eurasia, Middle East
and Europe.32 For example, in July 2006 British Petroleum
opened a new pipeline through Turkey bringing oil from
the Caucasus to the Mediterranean and able to carry 5% of
the world’s oil.33 In May 2010 Turkey signed an agreement
with Russia to carry Russian oil from the Black Sea to the
the Mediterranean.34 There are also important gas projects
that connect the two countries including a pipeline from
Russia to Greece, Italy and Israel and from Russia to
Southern Europe – both through Turkey or the Turkish
sector of the Black Sea waters.356. The West, Russia and Eurasia
After the ColdWar, theWest’s thinking about Russia and
Eurasia has followed two distinct trajectories. In the mid-
1990s, American geopoliticians, like Zbigniew Brzezinski,
recommended that the United States, in its capacity of the
world’s hegemonic power, pursue a policy of replacing
Russia as the referee and protector of the newly established
non-Russian states in the region.36 Recycling centuries-old
arguments about Russia’s cultural “expansionism” and
“imperialism,” they insisted on its principal inability to play
a constructive and stabilizing role and were ably assisted in
it by Russia’s own pro-Western thinkers.37
Another prominent school in the West has been
arguing since the 1990s that Russia is irrelevant as
a serious power, insisting that the country is nothing but
a weak state that “simply cannot ‘make it,’ with Western
help or without it.”38 Members of Russia’s “irrelevance”
school are convinced that the country is fundamentally
weakened by the competition of rival clans within the
Kremlin and the overall political class.39 They also
advance the notion of the U.S.-China alliance for
managing Eurasian security challenges.40 Although the
arrival of Barak Obama to power has given the United
States a doze of realism about its international abilities,
the Russia irrelevance school remains as inﬂuential as
ever. For example, one of the school’s prominent
spokesmen, Vice-President Joseph Biden, has insisted that
there was no need for the United States to seriously
change its policy by taking Russia into consideration. "The32 Sakwa (2009).
33 Akerib, Michael, “The Eurasian Idea: Where the Eagle Looks,”
November 1, 2006 <www.shapingtomorrow.com>.
34 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Turkey, Russia sign agreement on oil pipeline,” AP,
May 12, 2010.
35 Anna Smolchenko, “Medvedev hails ’strategic’ Turkey ties,” AFP, May
12, 2010.
36 Brzezinski (1994). See also Brzezinski (1998), Clover (1999).
37 For example, see Trenin (2001). For analysis of American phobias of
Russia after the Cold War, see Tsygankov (2009).
38 Tayler (2001), Odom (2001).
39 For example, Celeste Wallander (2007, p. 140) argues that Russia’s
grand strategy is “neither grand, nor strategic, nor sustainable,” and
“whether Russia will survive as a great power in the 21st century is an
open question” because it practices the culture of patronage and
corruption that continues to reveal the ineffectiveness of the state.
40 See, for example, Brzezinski (1998); Henry A. Kissinger, “The chance
for a new world order,” New York Times, January 12, 2009.reality is, the Russians are where they are," Biden said in
the midst of the global ﬁnancial crisis. "They have
a shrinking population base, they have a withering
economy, they have a banking sector and structure that is
not likely to be able to withstand the next 15 years,
they’re in a situation where the world is changing before
them and they’re clinging to something in the past that is
not sustainable."41
After an initial hesitation, the United States and other
Western nations have followed the advice to sideline Russia
in the region. Yet the West’s attempts to secure and stabi-
lize Eurasia after the end of the Cold War should be
recognized as a failure. Eurasia has not become stable or
peaceful and continues to disintegrate. The arrogant
bureaucrats in Washington and Brussels have failed to
understand that they lack the resources, the will, and the
experience to stabilize the complex region. Today – after
the Iraq war and the global ﬁnancial crisis – the United
States is beginning to recognize its over-extension in the
world, but it is not at all clear if Washington and Brussels
are prepared to act differently in Eurasia. Rather than being
guided by the Russia irrelevance approach, Western
diplomacy will do well to recognize that, evenwhile unable
to prevent a further meltdown of Eurasia on its own, Russia
remains a critically important and potentially indispens-
able power.7. Why Russia still matters
Russia’s importance in Eurasia can be described in four
principal ways. First, Russia continues to possess dominant
military and diplomatic resources which it has already used
effectively to resolve several violent conﬂicts in the region,
such as those in Tajikistan and Moldova in the 1990s and in
Georgia in 2008.
Second, Russia remains a nation with an incomparable
historical experience and cultural capital for pacifying the
volatile territories from the Balkans to Central Asia. The
nations of Eurasia go back centuries and have developed
similar cultural experiences. During the Soviet era, they
shared external borders, fought the same enemies, and
were subject to similar linguistic and cultural policies.
Although the Baltics were independent during the interwar
years and preserved a sense of national identity evenwhile
a part of the Soviet empire, other republics’ experience
with statehood was too short and fragmented to develop
a sufﬁciently strong sense of cultural distinctiveness.
Russian was the common second language in non-Russian
republics and the mother tongue of many professionals
and politicians. Today it remains the common language
uniting the former republics. People across the region
watch the same Russian-language news broadcasts,
movies, serials, and soap operas. They eat many of the same
foods, especially on holidays, and support the Russian
football team in international competitions. The bonds
across republics are strongest among business and political41 Vice President Joe Biden’s Interview to Peter Spiegel, Wall Street
Journal, July 23, 2009. <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1248462177
50479721.html>.
A.P. Tsygankov / Journal of Eurasian Studies 3 (2012) 1–9 7elites, many of whom were educated in the same univer-
sities, worked in the same institutions, and served together
in the Soviet army.42
Third, Russia is able to serve as a state-building example
in the region. Although it is in no position to offer viable
competition to the United States’ liberal democratic ideas,
Russia has been perceived by many in the region as
generally successful in accomplishing other state-building
tasks, such as providing citizens with order, basic social
services and protection against external threats. This
explains why ordinary people and many politicians from
Central Asia to Ukraine often rate Russia’s current leaders
higher than their own.43 Even outside the region, the
inﬂuence of Russia’s state-building experience is consid-
erable and rising. For instance, the report by the European
Council on Foreign Relations provides evidence of Russia
and China’s ability to attract votes at the United Nations.
The report notes that since the late 1990s, support for
Russian positions has risen from around 50%–76% today,
while support for the EU and US fell from over 70% and 75%
to around 50% and a mere 30%, respectively.44
Finally, Russia possesses enormous energy reserves
which it has been successfully exploiting to its advantage.
Russia has approximately 13% of the world’s known oil
reserves and 34% of its gas reserves.45 This power resource
has gained in importance as global energy demand and
prices have risen. As a result of competition with the
Kremlin over resources in Russia and the Caspian region,
American and European companies lost many opportu-
nities. Meanwhile, Russia remained an important oil and
gas producer, preserving its status as a major transit
country through which to carry energy from the Caucasus
and Central Asia to Europe. Part of Russia’s negotiating
success stems from the fact that the republics used to be
linked together in what Soviet planners called a “single
economic complex” that was anchored by Russia. Inter-
national trade and investment networks from the Soviet
era continue to facilitate commerce by keeping trans-
action costs low. After the breakup, several republics,
including Central Asia’s, Belarus and Armenia, initially
opposed the idea of establishing their own currencies and
severing commercial links with Russia. Russia has been
slow to withdraw its energy subsidies for the former
Soviet states, and all of them have taken advantage of this
discount. Transit states, such as the Baltics, Ukraine,
Moldova and Belarus, proﬁted handsomely by reselling
considerable portions of Russian supplies to European
consumers at the world market price. Today, millions of
labor migrants from the poorer republicsdMoldova,42 On Russia’s cultural capital, see sources listed in fn. 25.
43 The recent Gallup poll revealed that 61% of those living in the former
Soviet region approve of Russia’s leadership performance, whereas the
worldwide median approval of adults across 104 countries that Gallup
surveyed was only 27% (Julie Ray, “Russia’s Leadership Not Popular
Worldwide. Residents in former Soviet states are most likely to approve,”
August 5, 2011 <http://www.gallup.com/poll/148862/Russia-Leadership-
Not-Popular-Worldwide.aspx?version¼print>).
44 Gowan and Brantner (2008, p. 26).
45 Arbatov, Belova, and Feygin (2006).Tajikistan, and Azerbaijan, for exampledearn a living in
Russia because there are not enough jobs at home.
Of other large powers acting in this part of the world,
only Russia remains irreplaceable because it possesses all
the four listed attributes. By contrast, other leading powers,
such as China, the United States and the European Union
can only claim two out of four – military and diplomatic
tools as well as various components of the state-building
experience, but not the cultural capital and the energy
reserves.
8. Preventing Eurasian collapse
Given the signiﬁcance of Eurasia, preventing a collapse of
the region should be a number one priority. Although Russia
alone is not the solution, recognizing its critical role in
stabilizing Eurasia is essential. Once this is done in practice,
and not rhetorically, many pieces of the region’s puzzle will
start falling into their places. Energy supplies will become
more reliable; governments inpolitically contested areas, like
Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova, will obtain a greater legiti-
macy; and the so-called frozen conﬂicts will have a better
opportunity to be resolved. Russia’s recent resurgence is
a response to its lacking recognition as as a vital power and
partner of the West. Continuously denying Russia a genuine
engagement in the region – under false pretenses of its “neo-
imperialism” or “irrelevance” – is sure to bring additional
counter-productive effects. If nothing changes on the West’s
part and if Russia chooses to dedicate itself to obstructing
Western policies in Eurasia, we will soon see the collapsing
dynamics in the region. Ukraine and Moldova may disinte-
grate, as did Georgia. Belarus may be reintegrated with Rus-
sia. Central Asia and Azerbaijan are likely to be subjected to
a much greater degree of instability with unpredictable
consequences. Russia too will suffer greatly as its moderni-
zation processes will be derailed. In short, the region may
change beyond recognition – mostly through use of force.
Russia, of course, is only a part of the solution. Other
major powers must become involved as participants in
establishing a collective security arrangement in Eurasia.
From a security perspective, it is important that the three
most prominent actors in the region, NATO, SCO, and the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), develop
a joint assessment of threat and coordinate their policies.
Instead of expanding its reach further, NATO ought to learn
its limitations and stop efforts to solve problems in
Afghanistan or elsewhere unilaterally. Without a full-
ﬂedged involvement of SCO and CSTO, Afghanistan is
likely to turn into another version of Iraq, with additional
negative implications for the U.S. reputation in the world.
What is referred to as “Obama’s war” by pundits46 has the
potential of carrying lasting destructive consequences for
the larger Eurasian region.
Kyrgyzstan may serve as an example of how great
powers mismanage crises in the region. When the country
went through its ﬁrst violent change of power in March
2005, the event – accompanied by an even worst violence
in Uzbekistan’s Andijan in May 2005 – had the potential to46 Woodward (2010).
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powers were unable to agree on a uniﬁed response. The
change of power was strongly supported by the United
States and the European Union, while Russia and China
viewed the event as directed against their power and
security. When another, even more violent round of power
struggle occurred in Kyrgyzstan in June 2010, it again eli-
cited no serious response from key powers or international
organizations in the region. In the meantime, the new
interim government in Bishkek failed to gain control over
the country, and the southern part – a stronghold of the
ousted president Kurmanbek Bakiev – became a de facto
independent.47 The new elections that followed legitimized
the situation by empowering Bakiev’s party and delivering
a blow to the ruling coalition.48 The absence of an agree-
ment among key powers49 and a functional collective
security system in the region are sure to continue to serve
as catalists for Kyrgyzstan’s continued destabilization.
Another key issue is energy security. Although theo-
retically Russia and theWestern nations in the region could
build an energy consortium and even cooperate on the
basis of the International Energy Agency (IAE), in practice
they are engaged in a highly competitive zero sum inter-
action. A new, shared understanding of energy challenges
must be reached which would encourage a mutual respect
for each side’s critical interests. Viewing Russia as a poten-
tially reliable alternative to traditional Middle Eastern
sources of energy may serve the West and members of the
region better than the image of a “neo-imperialist” bully
that only seeks to subvert its neighbors’ policies. Here, too,
one might take advantage of existing yet poorly exploited
arrangements. For instance, the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium’s principles allow for a joint exploitation of
existing reserves and transportation routes and may be
extended to other projects. Trying to persuade European
countries to invest additional billions into the Russia-
alternative Nabucco pipeline may well turn out to be
a waste of money and time. As the West and Russia
continue their scramble for Caspian resources, both
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are building pipelines to
China andmay at some point consider cooperationwith the
Asian giant more advantageous to their interests. A more
important and potentially unifying idea for all the parties
would be to engage in the construction of acceptable rules
and principles of energy security among Eurasia’s powers.
Finally, for restoring the region’s capacity to function
and perform basic services for its residents it is critical to
curb the Russophobic nationalism. While rebuilding47 Andrew Higgins, “In Central Asia, a new headache for U.S. policy,”
Washington Post, September 1, 2010.
48 Grigori Mikhailov, Kirgizy podderzhali partiyi Bakiyeva,” Nezavisi-
maya gazeta, October 12, 2010; ”Kyrgyz election leads to disintegration,”
Russia Today, October 8, 2010 <www.russiatoday.com>.
49 Although there were some reports of an improved US–Russia coop-
eration in the region (See, for example, U.S. Asked Russia to Send Troops
to Kyrgyzstan At Height of Rioting,” Interfax, September 6, 2010),
elements of mistrust and competition prevail (M.K. Bhadrakumar, “US,
Russia fail to grip Kyrgyz helm,” Asia Times, June 26, 2010; Steve Gut-
terman, “Russia, U.S. at odds on Kyrgyzstan’s future,” Reuters, October 6,
2010; Kabai Karabekov and Gennadi Sysoyev, “Kirgiziya razbazarivayet
rossiyskiye interesy,” Kommersant, February 18, 2011).a Russia-centered empirewould be very dangerous, there is
hardly an alternative to the emergence of an economically
and culturally transparent community of nations with
strong ties to the former metropole. For Russia not to raise
the issue of ethnic “reuniﬁcation” of some 20 million
Russians living outside their “homeland”, it is necessary to
facilitate the establishment of conditions for cultural
openness across the region. Russians and other ethnic
minorities must be able freely to travel, practice their
linguistic and religious needs, and celebrate their histori-
cally signiﬁcant events. The overall objective of the outside
world should be to strengthen Russia’s conﬁdence as
a regional great power, while discouraging it from engaging
in revisionist behavior.References
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